Royal Flush

Transparency in and around the policing world, is like that old Chinese proverb about interesting times; it is both a curse and a blessing.

It is argued by some that the police being allowed to play out of view, operationally speaking, is a good thing. Others theorize that being hidden from public scrutiny allows the incompetent and mediocre to flourish and opens up the possibilities of fraud, corruption and even criminality. Large government regulatory operations often swell into multi-level layers of authority and can become by their very size –opaque.  

Commissions of Inquiry are one of the few times where the policing world and regulatory  arms of government are forced out of the shadows. The Cullen Commission into money laundering in this Province is proving no exception.

There are three main agencies being talked about: the BC Lottery Corporation (BCLC), the government Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch (GPEB), and the RCMP section— the Integrated Illegal Gaming Enforcement Team (IIGET). What is somewhat unusual in this inquiry is that all three of these agencies, the ones being called forward to present evidence, are staffed either by cops or ex-cops.  

Even more interesting, is that all the personalities are often pointing accusingly at the others. Their probity on full display, but describe having been burdened by their very own agencies and thwarted in their efforts. 

This Commission is also exposing the raw politics of our duly-elected —and their often limp efforts to expose wrong-doing. 

It is putting on full display inter-agency rivalries, conflicting mandates, and bureaucratic duplication. It is shining a light directly at the upper level managers in the RCMP in British Columbia— who it would appear felt that the subject of criminal activity in gaming was very far down the priority list. One could term this Commission as just another chapter in the lack of effort against white collar crime in this country.

The implementation of legalized gambling in British Columbia a number of years ago was met by public concern. Criminality, it has been well documented, often follows the introduction of gambling. British Columbia with its then well established large underground drug industry was a natural fit, ants to a picnic. Despite this obvious corollary, apparently, some under-estimated its eventual massive economic ripple effect. Was this a general lack of effort, or was it something more sinister? That is the root question facing Mr. Cullen. 

It should be said that the vast majority of the ex-cops testifying are shining examples of former police officers. Old school, still able to recognize right from wrong. It is becoming evident as this commission progresses that it was primarily politics and policy which subsumed any effort to thwart organized crime– not the personalities involved. 

At the same time, one could not help be struck by the level of cronyism which affects these regulatory bodies. Find one Mountie and swing a bag of rocks and you will hit another one, pulled up by their brother and sister officers into these Provincial post-retirement jobs. Those that testified, who may have been armed with the best intentions may have been guilty of having on occasion remained silent in the face of obvious wrong-doing. Content to stay within their assigned mandate. 

Gord Friesen and John Karlovec testified on behalf of the BCLC. Mr Friesen gave an overall picture of the workings and mandate of BCLC and this was echoed by Mr. Karlovec.

They described BCLC as being governed by a mandate which was often termed– to “observe and report”. They provided their information to the police through forms called Itrack (ph)reports to: GPEB,  FINTRAC (Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre), CFSEU (Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit), and to IPOC (Integrated Proceeds of Crime) group. BCLC devised the rules and conducted oversight, but they believed that they were not responsible for the enforcement. 

During this time both Karlovec and Friesen stated that the alternate Provincial agency, GPEB, was always insistent that it was they who were the primary “investigators”. When Friesen was asked about any feedback they would receive from GPEB, the answer was “no feedback….none”. This defies common sense. No information was being forwarded as to any criminal elements that would have been frequenting the establishments that BCLC investigators were in turn governing. 

At GPEB was Larry Vander Graff and Joe Schalk (also both former Mounties). Vander Graff was the Director and Schalk his deputy. Both of these individuals also enjoyed good reputations as police officers prior to leaving the RCMP. 

Peter German (former Mountie) who wrote the initial report gives credit to Schalk for having “nailed it” referring to his understanding of the money laundering problem. However, despite the possibility of GPEB playing a leading role, Schalk on more than one occasion is called out by the others as being a little over bearing in his demand to be seen as the single, go-to investigational authority, and the relationship between GPEB and BCLC floundered. 

In fact, the Ministry of Finance in April 2014 in a management audit, stated that the relationship between the two agencies was “so adversarial it has resulted in dysfunction in several levels within the division of BCLC.”. Years earlier, in 2007 during an Assessment Review by Katherine Tait, GPEB had been called “largely ineffective”. (It was also noted that during this time BCLC won a series of ministerial workplace “awards”)

Meanwhile at GPEB Schalk and the team members were pushing hard for greater funding from government, and becoming quite noisy in pushing back at their governmental masters, asking and possibly demanding  policy and practise changes. They were not so subtly inferring that they could not keep up with the job.  

For their apparent efforts both Vander Graff and Schalk were terminated without cause in 2014. 

There should be no mistake however that despite the individual mandates of BCLC and GPEB, everyone was still pointing at the Mounties as being primarily responsible for overall “criminal” investigation. They were the only ones with peace officer status and the much needed resources. That part was true in theory but in reality it was far different. 

Mounties during this time had become smitten with the term “integrated”. “Integration” had become the poster child, the marketed symbol of cohesion and effectiveness. Along came the Integrated Market Enforcement Team, the fore-mentioned Integrated Illegal Gambling Enforcement Team, the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team, and the Integrated Border Enforcement Team to name a few. 

Over time this exercise has met with very mixed results, some have even been disbanded with some not achieving actual “integration”. The media never caught on, all believing and still believing, that the very title implied a dedication to exceptional effort, co-ordination and unlimited manpower. They could not have been more wrong, especially when referring to the IIGET. 

The sum total of manpower after the formation of IIGET, to deal with the often financially complicated and intricate cases of money laundering— came to a grand total of twelve, with one assigned analyst. None of the personnel had any experience in gaming, but if they were lucky they were sent to Ontario to attend a two week training session. 

S/Sgt Tom Robertson headed this unit and readily admitted in testimony that he had no personal background in gaming, that none of his unit were properly trained, and that the team was spread out over four offices. Realizing quickly that they were severely undermanned and under qualified to take on the more serious money laundering cases, he re-aligned the group to focus on the use of illegal video lottery terminals, illegal bingos, raffles and common gaming houses. 

He underlined the need for political results and to undertake the cases they considered “High” level would risk them getting “tied up” despite that the more serious issues were part of their dictated mandate. During his short stint of about a year, Robertson said there were no prosecutions involving legal casinos other than the identifying of one loan shark who was brought to their attention by the casino security staff. There were no charges even in that single case. 

Robertson at one point talked about the fact that Larry Vander Graff, head of GPEB was worried about “infuriating” casinos and didn’t really want to ruffle any feathers. S/Sgt Robertson after a year, retired himself, and then also became an investigator for GPEB in the Kelowna area, where he stayed for the next nine years. 

Robertson after leaving had turned over the reins of IIGET to the newly assigned S/Sgt Fred Pinnock. Mr. Pinnock during the last few months has loomed large in the media. He has publicly expounded on the lack of effort by all levels in the gaming industry. In fact he asked for but was refused “standing” by the Cullen Commission. His time at IIGET and the build up of frustrations led to him leave the RCMP for medical reasons he testified.  

Mr. Pinnock who is now retired, did not waste his time on the stand and provided some very personal opinions about all that was ailing both in his own unit, IIGIT, and the personalities that made up the other agencies. 

He even outed the inside source who had been feeding the reporter Sam Cooper (now working for Global) who had been doing a series of stories on the money laundering issues in Vancouver. The source was Ross Alderson who was employed by BCLC, left the agency in 2017, and according to Pinnock surreptitiously took most of the in-house BCLC files with him.

Pinnock described having written two separate business case plans, trying to expand his new unit with more manpower and resources, and both were denied, or more accurately ignored.  

He spoke about the fact that IIGET was part of a Consultative Board who were supposedly overseeing all the groups which met twice a year. This group was made up of the CO of E Division, the CEO of BCLC, the Director of GPEB, and Kevin Begg, then the Director of Police Services. He opined that this group was no more than window dressing, a “charade” in his words.

He described issues over mandates between GPEB and IIGET, which became so tainted that he made an application to move their entire unit from the shared office space, which was eventually granted. There were verbal arguments between he and Joe Shalk of GPEB on particular roles which resulted in a “significant enforcement gap”.  He claimed that GPEB never sent any information with regard to loan sharking or money laundering to them or reports of large money transactions. 

Pinnock describes dealing with the upper levels of the RCMP; Supt. Dick Bent, Supt Ward Clapham, Inspector Wayne Hulan and Supt Russ Nash. His immediate boss was Don Adam in the Major Crime Area, but this was during the time of the Pickton investigation which Adam became fully engrossed and therefore Pinnock claims, Adams had little time or interest in the other side of the house and IIGET. 

In another twist, Pinnock who seemed to be talking to anyone who would listen to his plight, was then dating MLA Naomi Yamamoto, who was in 2015 appointed as Minister of State for Emergency Preparedness. It was through her, that Pinnock requested a meeting with Rich Coleman, who was then Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General. That specific meeting never took place, although Pinnock, again through his now-wife met Coleman on some later casual occasions.

Larry Vander Graff the Executive Director of GPEB, testified that he too brought up the problem directly to Rich Coleman. When describing $10,000 wrapped in elastic and $20 denominations, Vander Graff says that  Coleman’s disingenuous response was that he knows lots of people with that amount of money in their pockets. Vander Graff also talked about reporting to another integrated unit, IPOC(Integrated Proceeds of Crime unit), but that too was disbanded in 2013.

Mr. Pinnock talked about his relationship with Kash Heed, someone he considered a “friend”, who in the Fall of 2009 was involved in the government. Heed besides being a former Superintendent with the VPD and West Vancouver Chief of Police was then an MLA. In 2010 he would go on to briefly become the Solicitor General, but later  had to resign. Mr. Heed’s career, his often outspoken nature and his willingness to get on the soap box has often led him into the firing line. 

In a meeting with Pinnock in the Fall of 2009, Heed said that any increased enforcement efforts in the gaming end of things fell to Rich Coleman. In Pinnock’s recollection of the conversation, he said that Heed told him that Coleman was “all about the money”. The inference being obvious. He went further in this private conversation with Pinnock wherein Pinnock claims that Heed named three RCMP executives who he thought were “complicit”. Pinnock named them as; C/Supt Dick Bent, Al McIntyre and Gary Bass. He said that Heed called them “puppets” for Rich Coleman. Pinnock says he kept no notes about this meeting and during cross-examination he faltered a bit on whether these were the actual words at the time. 

In 2018 Pinnock was apparently convinced that with the German report upcoming, that he may have to play a role in any inquiries into gambling,  Pinnock had a phone conversation with Heed in 2018 and in that conversation Pinnock hoped to have Heed repeat what he said in 2009. This time Pinnock surreptitiously recorded Heed. Legal, yes. Ethical, maybe not.

Pinnock has now turned over three transcripts to the Commission of his conversations with Heed, which are being redacted and people named have been given the opportunity to respond or make an appearance before the Commission. 

During questioning by the other participants, Pinnock said that he was never contacted by Peter German during his inquiry. He admitted to being “disappointed” that he was not called. In viewing and listening to Mr. Pinnock one does get a sense of him enjoying the cloak of a white knight and often his evidence seems slightly tainted by personal animus. His conversations with Heed with regard to Coleman make for headlines, but they are of course nothing more than political gossip. There is no smoking gun, no direct evidence of anything.

The Commission is proving to be a frustrating exercise for any outside observer. British Columbia is emblematic of the rest of Canada where governments at three levels have become enamoured with increased legalized gambling revenues. Not so dutiful to regulation and enforcement. 

The abilities of governments to pass laws, set up committees, regulatory bodies, or “consultative” boards is their strength. Coffee, bottled water, and chicken wraps flow through the various government committee and board rooms of Federal and Provincial ever growing bureaucracies. The laws and the regulations are often drawn up with little regard for enforcement or oversight. When confronted with the need for action these government groups often flail about drowning in a sea of jurisdictions, interpretations, mandates, and the large bureaucratic structures become a hindrance unto themselves. 

In this case, three regulatory bodies were joined —supposedly in the fight against money laundering. 

BCLC has 900 employees in this Province, in 2013 there were the equivalent of 3600 full time equivalent jobs at GPEB.  IIGET, the agency responsible for the criminal aspect, was allocated by senior management in the RCMP a whopping 12 untrained officers. In addition the three groups didn’t get along and literally stopped talking to each other. The lack of operational results was maddeningly predictable.

As of November 2020, Ken Ackles (also a former RCMP officer), who headed GPEB in 2013, testified that he did not know of any single conviction for money laundering to date.

Clearly there are a few people who gained during this mayhem. Organized crime of course; ex-cops looking for a somewhat lucrative 2nd income, and now the more then 41 lawyers sitting on this Commission. 

Government revenues have exceeded $3.1 billion.

Somewhere, therein lies both the question and the answer. 

Photo courtesy of www.davidbaxendale.com via Flickr Commons – Some Rights Reserved

Editorial Note: At the time of this report, Kash Heed has yet to appear to defend himself, nor has Rich Coleman, or the RCMP named managers.

Want to be a Terrorist? Call the RCMP help line..

In the last couple of months, the RCMP and its multiple investigative arms have been dealt several kicks to its institutional gut. They have had three major cases stayed in the last couple of months; one involved money laundering, another drug smuggling, and the third was a case of domestic terrorism. They say time heals and thanks to our speedy court system, all of these cases have had some years pass, making us forget the RCMP management bouquets of self-congratulations and the blowing of trumpets at the time of the original arrests. All three of these cases deserve scrutiny and demand some explanations, however the novelty of the terrorist case may be the most interesting and the most concerning.

The RCMP foray into the case of domestic terrorism involved the two now infamous “targets”; John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. A startled public expressed shock and consternation, as for some reason most Canadians still believe they are immune to this kind of thing, while the media tried to outdo each other with terrorism hyperbole.

A trial and the appeal courts five years later however found something quite different. After the initial trial the presiding judge basically overruled the jury, and announced that the two had been entrapped and entered a stay of proceedings on all charges. A couple of more years later, the Appeals court agreed with Judge Catherine Bruce, that this was a “clear case of police manufactured crime…”. That the police “did not disrupt an ongoing criminal plan” as had been advertised, in fact the police conduct of this file was a “travesty of justice”. Harsh words, even for a court system which is never reluctant to put the police on trial.

It is too easy to just say that the police “screwed up” in this incidence. One needs to dig down, sift through some layers of bureaucracy and investigational mandates, to begin to understand where this case went wrong and to begin to understand who should be accountable.

One has to start with the “targets”. Who were these terrorists, Nuttall and Korody? Well, their most notable feature may be the fact that they were two heroine addicts on the methadone program; they did not have their own residence living with Nuttall’s grandmother in a basement suite. They were on financial assistance, spent hours watching endless videos, and, rarely left the house. But somewhere in this sad, desperate, and often mindless existence, Mr Nuttall and Ms Korody decided to convert to Islam. Why? That will be left to the psychiatrists, but in hindsight their religion choice was probably the most significant factor. They likely would have gone unnoticed if they had turned to a different God.

It was 2013, the year of the Boston Marathon bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers. Islamic terrorism around the world was front and centre, both in the news and in the minds of the Ottawa Federal authorities. It would be a year later when a lone gunmen known in B.C. circles as “Muslim Mike” would attack the Parliament buildings in Ottawa. The political climate and the police were on edge. And it was the beginning of this mis-guided investigation.

There was a political environment fermenting in Ottawa, bubbling over with a need to thwart any budding terrorism. A need for the RCMP to prove itself to the world of our contribution to the righteous fight against terrorism. Instead, this investigation would turn out to be a shining example of institutional investigational “tunnel vision”, susceptible to over reaction and seeing ghosts where none existed.

It is also a story of how once the police machine is grinding along it is very difficult to reverse or stop the process, often rolling over any contrary narrative, or any human rights in the process. It is a difficult to explain, a mindset of how everything undertaken must be a success, there was no other option.

Compounding this clouded vision was a lack of supervision, a lack of understanding of the law, and two factions in the RCMP who were at odds with each other on how to proceed.

Clearly he was a violent person, but there are many of them that come across the police blotter, so what made him different than the others. How did this common criminal step over the threshold into terrorism?

In July 2012, the first mention of Nuttall showing some signs of his new prescription for life occurred when a female accidentally overheard a conversation on the street. Mr. Nuttall was on a cellphone, talking or yelling, about “blowing up” Islamic countries and making references to the “afterlife”. The female contacted the police, who attended and spoke with her to verify what she heard. When they spoke with her they noted that she was intoxicated.

A few months later another individual, who the courts call M.C. met Mr. Nuttall at a mosque. The recently converted Nuttall spoke of having killed a Jewish woman (which was later determined to be false); and he wanted help travelling to Afghanistan to take part in a violent jihad. Mr Nuttall was banned from several mosques because of his aberrant behaviour and the individual M.C. expressed concern for Nuttall’s mental health.

There should be no doubt that Nuttall was violent: convictions for robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault and at least two incidents of domestic violence against his girlfriend/spouse Amanda Korody. All the files referred to his mental instability and behavioural issues.

In normal times, under normal circumstances, Mr Nuttall would have continued to be a proverbial flag in police computers a notation on his police file should he pop up in terms of any investigation or complaint. He seemed more of a subject for the Mental Health Act, seeming to always exhibit behaviour consistent with mental instability. In this case, if he was indeed a wannabe terrorist, he had no problem announcing to the world or anyone that would listen, that he was one, or at least wanted to become one.

An overheard phone call by itself does not warrant too much further action, but then along comes the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), who sends a letter to the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) stating that Nuttall was a “potential threat to national security”. It was a “tip”, there was no source of the information given, and there were no actionable details.

A couple of months after this, CSIS sends another letter, updating their information to INSET; upping the ante as it were, now declaring that Nuttall had tried to purchase or had bought potassium nitrate. A chemical that can be used in the creation of explosives. This report too was unconfirmed at the time and in the end never corroborated.

So armed with this rather limited and unbacked information, INSET launches into an investigation. They conduct surveillance on Nuttall and Korody, and quickly learn that they are quite boring, never leave the house, and appear to have no life outside the walls of their house.

Yet, despite the negative findings, and despite it being uncorroborated information, this investigative group decides somewhat surprisingly that they will enter into an expensive undercover investigation, a technique usually used when in possession of much harder information. No terrorist activities had been uncovered, they had little more than one individual, Mr Nuttall, who may have been qualified for examination under the mental health act to justify this next step.

There was no evidence that Mr Nuttall was involved with a terrorist group, but to give the benefit of doubt, the police in this instance presumably must have felt there was enough there to warrant some form of “infiltration”.

There were three investigational groups that became directly involved. The respective mandates and the nuanced differences was where this file left them susceptible to mistakes.

CSIS is an intelligence agency that deals only in intelligence, it does not go to court, its investigations do not face scrutiny or examination in any public forum. It does not want to be exposed to any public light, out of necessity they argue.

CSIS was formed in the early 1980’s when the MacDonald Commission took Security Service away from the RCMP and formed this alternate agency (the primary reason, ironically considering this case, being that the Commission felt that the RCMP lacked the political sophistication to investigate groups such as the FLQ at the time).

The effectiveness of CSIS and its contributions to our national security, are up for conjecture and debate, as no one is fully versed on what they are doing; short of the cabinet committee on security and intelligence. Therefore, the public will likely remain in the dark, now and into the future. It can be argued that there is an investigational necessity to secrecy in the world of intelligence, but the fact that there never will be a shining light on their operational effectiveness, also makes for a convenient and easy hiding place, and is fully reliant on the public trust of Ottawa and its politicians.

With this mandate and with this structure at CSIS, when they receive or are exposed to information which is of a criminal nature, they are mandate bound to turn it over to the police for further investigation, which in this case is INSET. When CSIS makes the decision to turn over this or any criminal information, in some ways their interest in the case fades, as does their willingness and ability to cooperate.

INSET is the Federally directed group within the RCMP, with sections in the various Provinces including British Columbia. For a number of years it has been an innocuous group, hardly heard from, with a reputation of a good place to spend your retirement years, a sleepy hollow, an arm who often liked to hide behind the nomenclature of “national security” if ever questioned. As a result INSET is rarely heard or seen in the public eye.

However, over the last few years it has enjoyed a renewal, brought on by greater Ottawa Federal interest, a large increase in their manpower resources and budget, and this section began to catch the eye of Major Crime investigators who wanted a little quieter lifestyle. As an example, two of the three INSET investigators who formed the investigative group in this Nuttall case came from Major Crime backgrounds. One other thing should be noted and may be a key to understanding what went wrong, is that these major crime investigators brought with them some major crime investigative techniques; which often included undercover operations. That was their experience, it was part of their toolbox.

The third group of significance who may have played the most significant role in this investigation was the “Undercover Shop”. A relatively small section, which developed about 30 years ago. It was a group specifically designed to get close to the criminal element by being one of them, becoming entrusted by them, with the ultimate goal of obtaining confessions or uncovering criminal ties. It enjoys a somewhat misplaced allure not often found in other investigational teams.

As the years have moved on they have become more exposed through the courts, the techniques often on full display, the methods studied in criminology courses. They even talk about it on their own public website. If you were listening to talk radio today you would have heard their techniques being the subject of talk radio. Any technique that is exposed to such a great degree, is less effective and possibly dangerous.

Over they years the Undercover Unit developed tried and true “scenarios”; staged one act plays with police officers pretending to be part of the criminal element, designed to further their credibility with the target; all hopefully leading to a point where the target fills the need to inform “Mr. Big” about his previous criminality. Ultimately the target wants to please, to gain approval of the actor playing Mr. Big and the acceptance and protection of the fake criminal group. In some cases, these scenarios drag on, and there can be over over fifty such “scenarios” or more, but in this Nuttall case, there were only twenty-eight, which may also be a flag of either wanting the file to end, or one borne of a hurried desperation to reach the goal.

In the late 1990’s the U.C. unit became heavily involved with Major Crime teams and began to deal almost exclusively with homicide cases. since 2008 they have been involved in some 350 cases in which 95% have resulted in conviction.) These were cases where murders had been committed, the suspect had been identified by major crime investigators, and the goal of the undercover operation was to get a “confession” to the crime, often to corroborate and verify the circumstantial evidence in the case. It was an important role to play, but it was not up to this group to conduct the investigation.

The Undercover Unit’s exposure in the courts over the last ten years has led many investigators, lawyers, and academics to question whether their techniques are becoming fragile; that these techniques only work on the feeble minded, the un-connected, the neophytes of the criminal world. The unit was becoming less successful with more exposure, and several times have been called out by their “targets” as being the police. They do not talk about the cases that went wrong, nor should you ever hear about them, at least in theory.

So these two factions came together, INSET and the U.C. group, no doubt with the approval of upper management in both B.C. and in Ottawa and a decision was made that an undercover operation would be undertaken. Even though there had been no offence committed, by Nuttall or Korody, and maybe just as notable even though there was no confession being sought. This was by its very design somewhat of a fishing trip, characteristic in some ways of any “infiltration”.

The U.C. group was about to undertake an operation with no goal other than the infiltration of these two abhorrent but sad individuals, but began using a technique that was geared to obtaining specific results, a confession, a “Mr. Big”. The nature of the scenarios were a combination of a need to infiltrate, but they also began using techniques aimed at ending at a Mr. Big. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive from any investigators standpoint and could lead to confusion in the goals if nothing else. How does one aim for a confession if there is no crime? The very setup and the road they were going down was pre-destined to lead to claims of entrapment. They needed to create the crime and push the two targets toward it, the building blocks to an argument of being entrapped.

One should also point out that these types of operations can easily get into the millions of dollars in terms of cost, but there was no municipal or provincial budget oversight–INSET and the U.C. group were playing with Federal monies. (It is interesting to note that with this new found interest in terrorist files in Ottawa, INSET’s budget went from $717,000 in 2003 and in 2013, the year of this case, it was at $22.9 million.)

So the Undercover Operation began. The “hook” or “bump” into Nuttall by the undercover operators was tried and true, the old “would you help me look for my sister” line to act as a public introduction. Nuttall fell hook line and sinker, which in some ways should also have been a red flag, a warning signal as to Nuttall’s mental capacity and competence. He eventually became so enamoured with the operator that he even declared his love for him.

Without going into all the scenarios that were employed, suffice to say that Nuttall throughout: talked of extravagant plans, made ridiculous demands, was unable to focus, could not carry out the simplest of tasks. He went from wanting to kill civilians, to wanting to kill soldiers, from wanting to blow up a nuclear submarine, to blowing up a passenger ferry but not wanting to kill children or innocents. He wanted to blow up the “train” to Victoria, so was quite disappointed to find there was no train that went to Victoria.

He went from wanting to build rockets, and getting access to sniper rifles, to eventually settling for the building of pressure cooker bombs just like the Boston bombers. This more controllable goal was pushed at the suggestion and direction of the Undercover group.

The U.C. “shop” continued to focus on getting Nuttall to write down his plans, no doubt believing that it would be corroboration of his intent and capabilities. Nuttall claimed to have those plans on his laptop, then discovered to not having plans, to being asked to write down plans, and then not being able to physically complete them.

His goals went from freeing Omar Khadr, to forcing the American army out of Afghanistan, to having all the prisoners released from Guantanamo. He was “in training” when he was playing “paintball”. His goals, dreams, needs and plans changed daily. He could not carry out a common grocery list even when directed by the UC operator.

So it was borne out of necessity that the Undercover group began to direct him. (It should be noted that the primary undercover operator despite all of the above, testified that he did not believe that Nuttall was “incapable”).

Once the police begin to direct, all the police personnel involved should have been aware that they were no longer toying with “entrapment” they were now within its grasp. And as early as May 2013 some opinion inside the U.C. shop began to talk about the fact that they were exerting too much influence through the primary undercover operator. One of the investigative team Sargents argued that Nuttall and Korody did not represent a “risk”. Sources say that this Sargent ended up leaving the investigative team, turning over the running of the file to someone with more intensity to push this file.

So it carried on, with Nuttall carrying on his delusional path. At one point he even breaks down crying because he can not write out a plan as he had been directed. He fears the wrath of the undercover operator because he couldn’t do what he was told, even on one occaisson bringing a “marble gun” for protection. After finally settling with a plan, albeit unwritten, to blow up the Parliament buildings in Victoria.

Nuttall insists on videotaping a “recce” to check out the target area discreetly. He is promptly seen talking to police, tourist guides, and using his own name, clearly not having learned the lesson that he should be somewhat covert.

Nuttall emerges from this mayhem, with an agreement with the undercover team to build pressure cooker bombs, just like the Boston brothers. The undercover team manages to control this process, to the point that they were able to make them inert and give them back to Nuttall, so they could be buried in the bushes outside the Victoria Legislature buildings. (They also forget to get the appropriate warrant to give the “bombs” back to Nuttall with a minute trace of C4 and the courts pointed out that the RCMP had in fact broken the law)

Nuttall gets cold feet as the moment nears, to the point of asking for a “spiritual advisor”, and refers to dying like a “martyr”. Graciously, he says he would bequeath his paint gun to the undercover operator for future training purposes.

In the end of this farcical operation, they are allowed to bury the bombs in the “bushes”, and then went and sat in a hotel room waiting for the news to report their feat. Of course, they were bitterly disappointed when the news did not erupt.

With little trouble they were then arrested.

Equally surprising in this tale of misdeeds is that at the end of it all, the police managed to convince the Crown to lay charges.

And then, after the stay of proceedings placed by the trial Judge, The Crown had the audacity to appeal it, spending more tax dollars on clearly a fruitless mission. The Crown, argued in its appeal, that the two suspects were “completely responsible for crafting and carrying out the plan…and the RCMP operation was not manipulative”. It must have been hard keeping a straight face in their applications. There may have been mistakes made by the trial Judge in terms of some of the more legal issues, but no one could possibly argue that this was not entrapment.

The trial judge, Justice Catherine Bruce rightly said that the undercover operator “actually propelled Nuttall to a more extreme view”. She said the RCMP “instigated and skillfully engineered the very terrorist act committed by the defendants”. The RCMP “induced the commission of an offence..without reasonable suspicion or while acting mala fides”. One can forgive the odd Mountie from not understanding “entrapment”, but how do a group of lawyers not understand it.

So where does this leave us. After millions of dollars spent in lawyers and police operations and the errors in judgement will there be repercussions? Obviously not, this is government, this is the infallible RCMP, after all they are not holding anyone responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in sexual harassment claims.

It should raise questions, not just confined to the individual officers, but to the upper echelons, the supervisors who read and approved of these actions. We have a multi-layered and dysfunctional RCMP in terms of investigational mandates and recognition as to what constitutes a security threat. Sources are telling me that there is another three year long operation, which has also fallen under the same spell as Nuttall. That is trying to find suspects where none exist.

All of this is amplified by an Ottawa which has a severe disconnect with those officers on the ground who are conducting the investigations.

Miscommunication and understanding was compounded by a dogmatic and unbendable and unimaginative Undercover group who continue to use outdated techniques, not being able to recognize that the circumstances should not have been addressed by another “Mr Big”.

It was hurt by an intransigent investigative team, who seemed incapable of understanding entrapment, who just let the machine grind forward. One does not believe for a minute that the officers involved were ill-intentioned. They were struggling inside some vague criminal laws, were lacking sound guidance from Crown along the way and needed a fuller appreciation of the level of sophistication needed to prove an act of terrorism.

There is a monumental lack of understanding that a terrorist act is a political act. There is a 120 year old saying that “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”. Nuttall and Korody were neither.

Was Mr. Nuttall and Ms Korody dangerous individuals? To be sure. There are lots of dangerous people out there, just read Twitter.

There is a layered dysfunction in the RCMP. It is an organization consumed by gender and identity politics while a tornado of police needs and demands circle. Always trying to be the one fits all agency, all things to everyone. Doing everything, but not anything well. Whether it be white collar crime, child or internet crime, it never admits its failure, nor do they admit that they have been pulled in every direction while the government ignores or exacerbates chronic manpower and resource issues. They have grown or have been stretched too far, now too big to succeed. Only strong leadership and an honest appraisal of the capabilities and needs of this organization will pull it out of this flat spin.

*All the quotes in this story can be found from the judgement itself listed here:  2018 BCCA 479.

**Also, in terms of full disclosure, the author has had experience in major crime cases, and specifically in major crime cases, where an undercover operation which used the Mr. Big was employed. Some were successful, some were not. The author also was a member of Security Service which then became CSIS.

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