There are two agencies in Canada which go largely ignored, but fall under the various branches of enforcement. This is mainly due to the fact that both agencies, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communication Security Establishment (CSE) live and exist under a veil of secrecy. This is not by choice, their very mandate is to stay hidden, out of sight of the “enemy” and therefore equally out of sight of any prying Canadians who might be interested in seeing or measuring their value and effectiveness.

Both of these agencies are research and intelligence based organizations, so it is somewhat misleading to put them in the category of “investigative” units like the RCMP, or some other operational policing unit. They are less hands on and often dependent on other agencies to carry on the investigation when their gleaned intelligence traverses over into the criminal element. Also, one needs to remember that these are strictly “political” agencies, the enemies or their targets of their investigations are purely determined by the political powers of the day. So targeting can sometimes be confusing. Case history shows us that one person’s defined terrorist has the possibility of being tomorrow’s favoured politician. The examples are many; Yasser Arafat and the PLO, Sinn Fein and the IRA are a couple which come to mind, both leading terrorist organizations whose leaders then became favoured politicians. In Canada, think of the truck convoy protesters in Ottawa honking their horns and the Liberals then requesting that all Federal resources be joined into an investigation of them, including CSIS.

This is just to point out that when investigational mandates intertwine with elected politicians, even those that believe in the necessity of an organization such as CSIS, it is also agreed, that the line between legitimate targeting and Orwellian nightmares is a fine one. Therefore in the case of agencies such as CSIS, in order to maintain democratic freedoms, substantial oversight is needed to be put in place. This need coupled with the current level of claimed security and investigational privacy, in the CSIS case, the public is kept distant from any investigative results and instead we must rely on government committees and the like to oversee their investigations. The dilemma in other words is that the government that decides the targeting also oversees the agency doing the targeting.

In this post blog we are looking at CSIS, whose mandate is about as broad based and as open to interpretation as any existing in government. Section 12 (1) of the Act states that the mandate is to reduce “threats to the security of Canada” and tells them that they “may take measures, within or outside of Canada, to reduce the threat”. Of course there is an obvious problem when the language is so generalized as to be useless. What constitutes a “threat” and what are the “measures” that are available? The authors of the Act do try and define it further without much success by saying “the measures should be proportional in the circumstances, having regard to the nature of the threat”. No kidding. Furthermore, the Act says that before any undertaking they are counselled to “consult, as appropriate, with other Federal departments, or other agencies as to whether they are in a position to reduce the threat”. A second rather obvious directive.

Besides the gathering of “intelligence”, a very large part of the CSIS mandate is the conducting of security screenings of individuals entering Canada, or wanting to enter Canada, as well as the screening of persons under any of the current government programs. CSIS says that in 2025 they conducted 129,000 government related security screenings and over 438,600 immigration and citizenship referrals. There is no easy public measure of how effective those screenings are or how in depth and there have recently been a couple of stories which would indicate that the screenings are not foolproof, but it is very difficult to measure when looking from the outside in.

In terms of full disclosure, I was in the RCMP Security Service, the precursor for CSIS from about 1981 to 1984. Although asked to go to the new agency, I chose to return to criminal work. CSIS decided to go ahead without me and officially began in 1984; so it now haves a 40 year history, and has gone on with little or no outside mention or attention by the average member of the general public. Clearly it is easier to avoid controversy if one is allowed to never speak.

Despite this general need and application of secrecy, there have been two reports which recently came into public, or at least my view. One was by the Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology which examined the current plight of workers within CSIS. This was after receiving complaints from within the agency, who according to the complainants, were working in an environment “laden with stigma”. So in 2024 the study conducted interviews of 38 employees ranging in age from 31 to 64 years old. Of those interviewed 48% were female and 52% male. This is actually a statistically very small sample, as there are currently 3,367 employees in CSIS.

As an aside, for the record, those employees make up $493 million in salaries and have an additional $320 million in operating expenses. The CSIS overall budget therefore totals $813 million. The salary range for a CSIS intelligence officer is from $87,000 to $120,000. The head of the unit is Daniel Roger who has a salary of somewhere between $230,000 and $270,00 and sits at the executive level of a Deputy Minister.

So this is not a small agency but it is not a large agency either. As a comparison the RCMP have about 6,000 employees in British Columbia alone. The Journal study and the lead researcher, Rosemary Ricciardelli, from her inquiries discovered that the biggest problem for morale in the Service was the fact that the employees were “getting no recognition for what they do”. That they work in a field which is “exposed to potentially, physically or socially traumatic events”. As a result fewer than half of the employees interviewed “recommended working there.”

The first part of the finding leaves me a little apoplectic. Apparently we are led to believe that employees who joined and signed on to be part of a “spy ” agency didn’t think that their required duties and assignments needed to be kept secret? Do they feel neglected in not being able to take selfies at their work places or put video on Instagram showing “a day in the life of a spy”. Mind boggling.

As to the second part of being exposed to traumatic events, once again, what did they think the job involved? I would agree however that exposure to the day to day violence around the world would be at times heart breaking and possibly lead to depression and anxiety. And I would also agree that some sort of psychological counselling around this issue should be a permanent part of the protocol inside the agency. However those that are still unable to cope should be gently removed and asked to find other work as the work will always involve and be subject to a war torn and violently abusive world. With the war in Iraq, in Ukraine, Hamas, and those of similar ilk around the world, there is always present need to be vigilant and the work needs to be done. This organization needs to be populated with people who can handle it. Like police work, this is not soft and cuddly work.

The second report which caught my attention was the 2025 CSIS Public Report where CSIS themselves outlined their successes for the year. It is not over revealing as the language is in very broad generalities and their limited descriptions make it difficult to discover the level of direct involvement or investigation that was undertaken by CSIS themselves. For instance in the summary portion of this report, they maintain that they conducted 100 warrants, 15 court orders, 7 assistance orders and 1 production order. These numbers are not overwhelming by any investigative measure, one mid-sized RCMP detachment would conduct that many legal undertakings in a couple of months.

In the report the authors point to a few cases with which they were involved. They point to a 19 year old male in Winnipeg who was described as displaying “nihilistic violent extremism” and the case led to terrorism related charges. It would seem that the case originated with the National Security Enforcement Section who it can be safely assumed would have got some level of intelligence from CSIS, and then the Winnipeg Police Service became involved. Hard to measure the overall input of CSIS.

Then there is the Montreal teenager who it is alleged was preparing for some style of terrorist attack, and had been posting on social media “threatening comments” and was also trying to obtain a firearm. Forty officers were involved in his arrest but the case has not made it to court yet. Then there was the woman in Montreal, accused of being a member of ISIS. Oumaima Chouay apparently left the country 10 years ago to become a member of ISIS. She was given a one day sentence, in addition to the 110 days she served in pre-trial custody.

Needless to say, the above cases are not exactly earth shattering, but there were a few other cases that CSIS clearly likes to show their effectiveness, one of which was termed operation “Hide and Stalk”.

In this case CSIS tipped the RCMP in early 2023 to a group of Canadian military individuals who were operating under the code name “Hide and Stalk”. This group was formed advocating for an anti-government militia and tactical training group and was being led by an Armed Forces Master Corporal. The tip went to the RCMP who undertook surveillance, undercover operations, and uncovered a plot to seize some property in Quebec. After an extensive investigation four individuals were arrested and charged with “facilitating a terrorist activity”, “conspiracy to forcibly seize property” and a variety of weapons offences. The Redditt forums are split on the act of it actually being an act of terrorism, that it leaned more to the survivalist mentality, but the courts will be the ultimate decider.

There were a few other stand alone investigations. In March 2026, Mathew Althorpe of Toronto, who was a member of the Telegram collective, was sentenced to 20 years for producing videos, images, publications and posts on the social messaging app Telegram, which encouraged hate against minorities, and prosecutors said was done in aid of the terrorist network the Atomwaffen Division of the Telegram collective. There was also the “dark foreigner”, the handle for Patrick Gordon McDonald who was sentenced to 10 years in 2025 for also posting and extolling videos of racist attacks on Jewish people and he too was once associated to the Atomwaffen Division which is now defunct. Or the Hydro Quebec employee who was found to be committing “economic espionage”

In reading these cases, the actual level of involvement of the CSIS agency could range from a single piece of information learned to extensive legal applications and various levels of intel. So the ability to measure the effectiveness in any of these cases cannot be seen, in fact may never be known.

The CSIS report states that since 2014 there have been 20 terrorist attacks which have resulted in 29 deaths and 60 injured. They grandiosely state it would have been “higher without their work”.

In terms of oversight. CSIS reports to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Gary Anandasangaree, who is to give them “strategic direction and policy guidance”. This Minister has a human rights legal background and there is very mixed feelings about his overall effectiveness as a Minister. Then there is the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) who are there to insure “legality and propriety”. There is in addition the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) made up of MP’s and Senators. This latter group are described as there to act as an “independent, quasi judicial oversight body” and are in fact led by a retired Superior court judge. Their stated job is to have up front oversight by “reviewing and approving”. One does get the impression that a speedy decision in times of a national threat may be out of the question with the levels of bureaucracy that are currently in place, but nevertheless they are there. You just don’t get to see what they are dealing with or any decisions coming out of these bodies of government. I didn’t mention that there is also the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC), and there is also a group that measures the “Threat to Public Officials” and a group that is there to assess the “National Terrorism Threat Levels.”

In case you are interested this last group says that we are now at “Medium” threat level; which means that there is a “realistic possibility” of a terrorist threat. Feel better, because I am not so sure we have determined whether CSIS is a viable or effective organization? All we really know is that some people inside the organization don’t think you should apply for a job.