“Double dipping” for China?

There has been a new case surface in the last week or two, which caught the attention of these tired old eyes. It was when the RCMP made a grand national pronouncement that they had arrested and charged an ex-Mountie; William “Bill” Majcher , with two counts under Sections 22 and 23 of the little used Security of Information Act.

The story caught my attention on a number of fronts. First, I knew of Mr. Majcher, but only in passing; secondly, the investigation was done by the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET), and it was the INSET unit in Quebec, even though it very much sounded like the offences occurred in British Columbia. That seemed a little unusual and could only mean that there were others involved and there was a trust issue. For those that needed to be reminded, INSET is the RCMP agency which is the direct liaison with CSIS (Canada’s spy agency). Therefore one must always be aware that CSIS and thus INSET often work on “political targets”, and therefore their mandate is often at the direction of the government or with the approval of government. There is little to no police independence when talking about either of those entities. So we should also keep in mind that old adage that “one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter.”

With this in mind, China and its alleged political interference in recent Canadian elections has been a dominant story and pre-occupation for the last few months in Canada’s mainstream media. The Liberals have been under a great deal of political fire for their handling of the information surrounding the election interference, and their lack of investigation of it. So it seemed slightly more than coincidental that this case against Majcher was brought to the forefront in terms of its timing, and the obvious question as to whether it was being done to ease the pressure on the Liberals. Adding to the suspicion, is that these cases were historical, in that they occurred sometime during the years from 2014-2019. They also had said that this particular investigation had nothing to do with the alleged election interference. INSET says that their investigation surfaced as a result of a “complaint” in 2021, and now in 2023 they were bringing forth charges.

The accused, Mr. Majcher, was a Mountie from 1985 to 2007, some twenty-two years, and “retired” from the Inspector rank from the now defunct Integrated Market and Enforcement Team (IMET); an investigative group which had been mandated to investigate criminal activity in the Vancouver stock exchange and other financial markets. I met Mr. Majcher when he was the Inspector in charge, and we met out of necessity as he was the overseeing officer for an internal investigation that I completed on a Vancouver Police Department matter. He didn’t really pay much attention to the details of my report and signed off the investigation with little to no question. My first impressions of Mr. Majcher stand out now– and have been echoed by many people who knew him during his career. He began by showing me around his rather sumptuous office down on the Vancouver harbour front, and it was impressive from any government employee perspective, with its two storey high windows and its unhindered view of the moneyed yachts. It all turned out to be part of his pitch to me to come to their section, as they were looking for an experienced team leader/primary file investigator at the time.

He was a pretty impressive salesman about the job, but he was an obvious salesman, in that stock broker, car salesman kind of way. I later found out that before joining the RCMP he had in fact been a Eurobond trader. (Eurobonds by the way were one of the first tools developed and marketed to aid in the hiding of funds offshore) He was also clearly intelligent, but his flaw may have been in believing that he was always the smartest person in the room. He was always talking, but not overly concerned with listening. I considered the job at the time because of my interest in economic crime (much cleaner than homicide), but then turned it down after researching it a bit, and learning that the section was having trouble getting their feet off the ground, due to a variety of reasons and legal complications.

As it turned out, Mr. Majcher later got himself in some hot water while with IMET, and he became the subject of an internal investigation in 2005. I was told at the time, that it had something to do with his continuing involvement in the stock market, but I never heard the full story. In the end, presumably rather than face further investigation he “retired”– the always tried and true option the Mounties go to when handling troublesome employees. The public material says that Mr. Majcher in 2006, had already moved to Hong Kong– clearly never one to let the grass grow under his feet.

Like every ex-Mountie who is looking for a double-dipping job, and populate LinkedIn, Mr. Majcher talked up his previous investigational work experience and touted himself as an extraordinary undercover officer who continually risked life and limb in pursuit of the bad guy. His resumé was clearly bloated, but Mr. Majcher in fact did do a good job as an undercover operator on a couple of investigations. In the roles he played he was always portraying “the money guy” — always the salesman. His most famous case was that of the case against Vancouver lawyer Martin Chambers in the late 1990’s. Mr. Chambers during his hey-day was a prominent Vancouver lawyer who was suspected of large scale money laundering for the Russians and the Hells Angels. During a staged video-taped meeting in Florida with Mr. Majcher playing his role of financial underworld figure, Mr. Chambers took possession of $700,000 cash, and provided offers to handle millions of dollars. Mr. Majcher was the primary undercover officer and had led Chambers to believe that he monies were coming from the Columbian cartels at the time. It was a joint FBI-RCMP sting, and it was successful, and Mr. Chambers was sentenced to 15 years and 8 months which he served in an Arkansas jail.

The Chambers case would be the case that Mr. Majcher seems to have used as his plank to build a spring-board into a position in Hong Kong. He described himself as a “risk assessment officer” for the investment banking community, and that he had moved there to “establish an international banking platform on behalf of Hong Kong merchant bank, representing a number of Chinese state owned and non-state owned enterprise clients engaged in overseas capital world activities”. Not only would he bring to the table his extensive investigational expertise, but they would be able to employ “military grade cyber technology” in the pursuit for their clients.

He later formed the company EMIDR in 2016, a “Hong Kong based cyber-security company”. In a video he described himself as “a hired gun to help either large corporations or governments to get back what is rightfully theirs”.

Now most of us can see the salesman oozing out of these marketing pronouncements. But, despite the clear aggrandizement of his capabilities and the obvious exaggeration as to what they could bring to the world of money laundering, nevertheless, Mr. Majcher was indeed tapping into or at the very least trying to tap into a potential gold mine.

And this is where it all gets rather complicated.

It gets complicated in terms of the story line, and it gets complicated in the list of characters who may be playing in the game. First and foremost, this story is about money laundering, at least on the surface. But it is also about the many layers and degrees of inherent corruption. It is a fact that mainland China has had numerous individuals remove monies from their country, contrary to their own laws, as well as ill gotten gains that were taken out of the country from illegal activities. By any measure it is estimated that they have lost billions of dollars over the last number of years. And as you guessed, there have been a few select countries which these suspect individuals have turned to in order to facilitate the laundering of those funds. One of course, high on the list, is Canada, and specifically Vancouver. (do you remember the Cullen Commission?) Another area was along the “Gold coast” of Australia and the city of Melbourne. Their were other locations of interest to these monies seeking a home and the luxury of anonymity such as New York and Chicago. Hong Kong which was a city designated as a special administrative region of China, was heavily involved in the movement of those monies wanting to escape from China, due to its geographic proximity and the lack of foreign exchange controls.

The people who have orchestrated these money movements are now considered by the Chinese government to be criminals. As a result China started two projects; Sky Net in 2015 and Project Dragon in 2019, to track down and try and get back those monies. The latter project focused on the gold coast of Australia and those funds that were being used to purchase real estate. China of course, as Majcher himself stated in an interview, needs to “walk a very fine line”, as to the perception of anyone working for a foreign government. So China smartly formed public/ private partnerships with various firms, who would assist them in tracking down individuals and finding the monies. As expected they went to those with knowledge of the host countries who advertised themselves as having “expertise” in that country along with their “investigative resources”. Enter Majcher and other similar firms, especially those firms staffed by ex-police officers. Mr. Majcher openly said during a television interview that “I have a commercial relationship with entities that are in themselves associated in some form or another with policing authorities in China”.

Of course, most of these ex police officers who have entered this private field, have little or minimal hands on experience, they are primarily being hired because of their “contacts” in policing. Mr. Majcher is not a cyber expert, smashing the keyboard, hacking the demographic data sites to find someone; he is likely just picking up the phone and calling persons in the policing world who do have that information at their finger tips, and are willing to assist them in finding people. Mr. Majcher worked for the most part in British Columbia, ergo his contacts will be in British Columbia and in particular Vancouver, this hot bed for Chinese money laundering in Canada.

Two ex-Aussi police officers, Jason McFetridge and Austin Whittaker, in the Melbourne Australia area who had a similar firm to Mr. Majcher were interviewed about how the plan to recover the funds would come about and how it would be executed. Both maintain that it was a completely legitimate pursuit to get their client’s money back. It was a simple plan, but one that bordered on extortion. They would identify the people with the apparent illicit funds, confront them, tell them they are on to them, and that they needed to sign over their properties to the ex-police officer company. They in turn would then sell the company and send the monies back to China for a fat commission. The obvious inference, should the accused not “voluntarily” sign over the money, was that there would be repercussions for their families back in China, or telling them they face jail time if they ever return to China etc.

Does China have a right to pursue criminals and money launderers? It would seem legally justifiable, but what becomes questionable is of course how they go about it. Do they have the right to have hired personnel threaten people and insinuate sinister repercussions–that strains legality. It would have to be at the very least an inference and not a direct threat. The Skynet project apparently identified over 3,000 people that the Chinese government felt had broken their laws.

It would be easy to say the Chinese are wrong, and this is a step gone too far. And of course, what if the people they are pursuing are not criminals?

Historically Canada, and in particular Vancouver, has a very murky bordering on sinister relationship with communist China.

In 2015 China tried to sign agreements with the CBSA and the RCMP to assist them in pursuing their people of interest. In the late 1990’s Lai Changxing was considered “China’s most wanted fugitive”, a man who had been implicated in several corruption scandals in China involving a large smuggling ring. He evaded arrest and settled in Vancouver, where he was arrested by Canadian authorities, went through a long extradition battle but eventually was sent back to China in 2011, where he was given a life sentence. So at one time, the Canadian government was participating in the very same thing.

There is the Meng Wanzhou matter where a high ranking member of the Chinese establishment and the Chief Financial officer for Huawei was arrested in Vancouver, on behalf of the Americans and was facing extradition. China retaliated by arresting two innocent Canadians as “spies”, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. Meng eventually reached a “deferred prosecution agreement” with the Americans, the charges were dropped, and she was returned to China after having been under house arrest for close to three years. During this time she was given VIP protection to and from court by the Lions Gate Risk Management group, a group also filled with many ex-police officers who also advertise their specialities in “Money laundering and Asset tracing”. Mr. Majcher during this time admits to also being contacted by China looking for some help and monitoring of the case against Meng.

And let us not forget the matter of the ex-Mountie, Ben Chang, who during the Wanzhou hearings refused to testify about his role in the arrest of Meng Wanzhou while an RCMP officer. Since the arrest time, Mr. Chang had turned his old foreign liaison posting with the RCMP in Hong Kong into a retirement job as a senior security officer in the resort casino Galaxy Macau. His last minute refusal cast doubt on the credibility of the government lawyers who maintained that the RCMP did not share any information on Ms. Weng’s computers and mobile phones. Somewhat mysteriously, the prosecutors did not subpoena Mr. Chang. The Galaxy group as it turned out is owned by Lui Che Woo, a Hong Kong businessman who served on the standing committee of an advisory group to Bejing. Mr. Majcher it has been reported to have been at one time Mr. Chang’s supervisor.

INSET has hinted that they are looking at other officers involved in Mr. Majcher’s case. One of the names surfacing is Ken “Kim” Marsh, another ex-RCMP officer, who has written a book about his exploits entitled “Cunning Edge”. Mr. Marsh who has been named as a co-conspirator with Mr. Majcher, but not yet charged, once cooperated with Majcher on cases; and Marsh identifies himself as his “Mountie friend”. In his book Marsh talks about being “hooked up” with Russian millionaire Vladimir Antonov for a “due diligence report” that he charged Antonov $500,000 to prepare. Antonov would later be charged with embezzling “hundreds of millions of dollars from a bank in Lithuania”. Marsh is now seemingly perplexed by his naming in this most recent Majcher investigation. As he says in the introduction to his book, “he gave decades of his life to his work, all in the pursuit of bringing bad guys to justice…for his clients…and society at large”. He doesn’t mention that it was also primarily to make money.

So what are the charges specifically? Section 22 is labelled “preparatory acts” and states in essence that anyone who enters Canada,… or retains or gains access to any information… for the benefit of a foreign entity, a terrorist group, or an economic entity… and then communicates that information to them is guilty of an offence. This section refers back to Section 16, 17, 19 and 20 which get more specific as to whether the information is designed to “harm Canadian interests…or is reckless with that information”. Section 20 deals with using the information in association with a “foreign entity” to “induce, by threat, accusation, menace or violence, any person to do anything or cause anything to be done”. Section 23 is just the “conspiracy” section saying that one can not conspire to do any of the above.

So there is three elements to these offences that need to be proven. Was Majcher working for a foreign entity? Did they obtain information that was being guarded by the government, and finally did they threaten anybody or coerce anybody to take some action on behalf of the foreign entity? In terms of the press briefing by Inspector David Beaudoin they say that the charges surround “preparatory acts for the benefit of a foreign entity and conspiracy”. As stated previously, they began their investigation in the fall of 2021, and it was for the time period of 2014-2019. There are going to be some significant legal hurdles. Does the government of China have the right to pursue persons they consider thieves and money launderers? Are private investigators, indirectly working for the foreign government allowed to make inquiries as to money laundering and attempt to find those persons? America, Britain, Australia and even Canada using various investigational instruments make inquiries constantly for this same purpose. The RCMP and Canada have directly participated in doing the very same thing, but of course they will argue that they and only they are the safe-guarders of that information.

If one is interested in this kind of thing and would like a full view of the extent of the problem, I recommend the book “Moneyland” which the Economist magazine called the “book of the year”, written by British journalist Oliver Bullough. It is a deep dive into money laundering and the people behind it, including the lawyers, bankers and governments that both front face the problem and are part of the problem. The city of Vancouver is featured as a sought after refuge for the kleptocrats from China, Russia, and south Asia and he outlines the number of groups trying to track them down, often frustrated by the lack of government action on the issue. It is such a broad and expansive problem that he argues that it is under cutting the pillars of western democracy.

There is one other aspect of this story that is intriguing. That is the media coverage of this story led by journalists like Sam Cooper changes the motivation behind China. Cooper who is never shy in trumpeting his investigative journalism skills on the subject of money laundering in Vancouver. As it turns out he has admittedly conferred in the past with Kim Marsh on stories such as the Cameron Ortis story; and it would be a pretty easy assumption that he has RCMP sources feeding him information. The interesting part is that his take, and therefore the apparent take of the RCMP is that China is “not interested in getting back their money…only interested in controlling the people in the country”. In other words it is all part of a conspiracy to control the Canadian government through spies and agents.

It is an interesting postulation, but there is little to no evidence to support it. There is no doubt that China has for decades searched out persons and politicians who would speak positively about China and possibly try to influence legislation. While in Security Service in the 1980’s and early 1990’s we were already watching the Chinese operatives in Canada trying to influence politicians. The problem is one of definition. In the U.S. for example, they simply call them “lobbyists”. Here, in this country there is not even a foreign registry set up, so how concerned or worried about it is the Canadian government? In Mr. Majcher’s case, there is much more evidence that China is going after the money, they have always been aggressive industrialists, and there is an abundance of evidence that there that there is a treasure trove of ex- Mounties who are willing to set their flexible ethics aside and give them a hand.

There is politics wrapped around politics in this investigation, and the timing is highly suspicious and of major interest will be who initiated the original complaint. In this new age of ingrained disinformation and when our media seems to have an agenda, it is increasingly necessary to question sources. But, when it comes to unravelling the mysteries of China and its cultural layers, one needs to be very careful indeed. The only aspect of this story that seems to bear out consistently, is that there are apparently plenty of of ex-cops willing to help– for a fee of course.

Photo courtesy of Images Money via Flickr Commons – Some rights reserved

Want to be a Terrorist? Call the RCMP help line..

In the last couple of months, the RCMP and its multiple investigative arms have been dealt several kicks to its institutional gut. They have had three major cases stayed in the last couple of months; one involved money laundering, another drug smuggling, and the third was a case of domestic terrorism. They say time heals and thanks to our speedy court system, all of these cases have had some years pass, making us forget the RCMP management bouquets of self-congratulations and the blowing of trumpets at the time of the original arrests. All three of these cases deserve scrutiny and demand some explanations, however the novelty of the terrorist case may be the most interesting and the most concerning.

The RCMP foray into the case of domestic terrorism involved the two now infamous “targets”; John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. A startled public expressed shock and consternation, as for some reason most Canadians still believe they are immune to this kind of thing, while the media tried to outdo each other with terrorism hyperbole.

A trial and the appeal courts five years later however found something quite different. After the initial trial the presiding judge basically overruled the jury, and announced that the two had been entrapped and entered a stay of proceedings on all charges. A couple of more years later, the Appeals court agreed with Judge Catherine Bruce, that this was a “clear case of police manufactured crime…”. That the police “did not disrupt an ongoing criminal plan” as had been advertised, in fact the police conduct of this file was a “travesty of justice”. Harsh words, even for a court system which is never reluctant to put the police on trial.

It is too easy to just say that the police “screwed up” in this incidence. One needs to dig down, sift through some layers of bureaucracy and investigational mandates, to begin to understand where this case went wrong and to begin to understand who should be accountable.

One has to start with the “targets”. Who were these terrorists, Nuttall and Korody? Well, their most notable feature may be the fact that they were two heroine addicts on the methadone program; they did not have their own residence living with Nuttall’s grandmother in a basement suite. They were on financial assistance, spent hours watching endless videos, and, rarely left the house. But somewhere in this sad, desperate, and often mindless existence, Mr Nuttall and Ms Korody decided to convert to Islam. Why? That will be left to the psychiatrists, but in hindsight their religion choice was probably the most significant factor. They likely would have gone unnoticed if they had turned to a different God.

It was 2013, the year of the Boston Marathon bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers. Islamic terrorism around the world was front and centre, both in the news and in the minds of the Ottawa Federal authorities. It would be a year later when a lone gunmen known in B.C. circles as “Muslim Mike” would attack the Parliament buildings in Ottawa. The political climate and the police were on edge. And it was the beginning of this mis-guided investigation.

There was a political environment fermenting in Ottawa, bubbling over with a need to thwart any budding terrorism. A need for the RCMP to prove itself to the world of our contribution to the righteous fight against terrorism. Instead, this investigation would turn out to be a shining example of institutional investigational “tunnel vision”, susceptible to over reaction and seeing ghosts where none existed.

It is also a story of how once the police machine is grinding along it is very difficult to reverse or stop the process, often rolling over any contrary narrative, or any human rights in the process. It is a difficult to explain, a mindset of how everything undertaken must be a success, there was no other option.

Compounding this clouded vision was a lack of supervision, a lack of understanding of the law, and two factions in the RCMP who were at odds with each other on how to proceed.

Clearly he was a violent person, but there are many of them that come across the police blotter, so what made him different than the others. How did this common criminal step over the threshold into terrorism?

In July 2012, the first mention of Nuttall showing some signs of his new prescription for life occurred when a female accidentally overheard a conversation on the street. Mr. Nuttall was on a cellphone, talking or yelling, about “blowing up” Islamic countries and making references to the “afterlife”. The female contacted the police, who attended and spoke with her to verify what she heard. When they spoke with her they noted that she was intoxicated.

A few months later another individual, who the courts call M.C. met Mr. Nuttall at a mosque. The recently converted Nuttall spoke of having killed a Jewish woman (which was later determined to be false); and he wanted help travelling to Afghanistan to take part in a violent jihad. Mr Nuttall was banned from several mosques because of his aberrant behaviour and the individual M.C. expressed concern for Nuttall’s mental health.

There should be no doubt that Nuttall was violent: convictions for robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault and at least two incidents of domestic violence against his girlfriend/spouse Amanda Korody. All the files referred to his mental instability and behavioural issues.

In normal times, under normal circumstances, Mr Nuttall would have continued to be a proverbial flag in police computers a notation on his police file should he pop up in terms of any investigation or complaint. He seemed more of a subject for the Mental Health Act, seeming to always exhibit behaviour consistent with mental instability. In this case, if he was indeed a wannabe terrorist, he had no problem announcing to the world or anyone that would listen, that he was one, or at least wanted to become one.

An overheard phone call by itself does not warrant too much further action, but then along comes the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), who sends a letter to the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) stating that Nuttall was a “potential threat to national security”. It was a “tip”, there was no source of the information given, and there were no actionable details.

A couple of months after this, CSIS sends another letter, updating their information to INSET; upping the ante as it were, now declaring that Nuttall had tried to purchase or had bought potassium nitrate. A chemical that can be used in the creation of explosives. This report too was unconfirmed at the time and in the end never corroborated.

So armed with this rather limited and unbacked information, INSET launches into an investigation. They conduct surveillance on Nuttall and Korody, and quickly learn that they are quite boring, never leave the house, and appear to have no life outside the walls of their house.

Yet, despite the negative findings, and despite it being uncorroborated information, this investigative group decides somewhat surprisingly that they will enter into an expensive undercover investigation, a technique usually used when in possession of much harder information. No terrorist activities had been uncovered, they had little more than one individual, Mr Nuttall, who may have been qualified for examination under the mental health act to justify this next step.

There was no evidence that Mr Nuttall was involved with a terrorist group, but to give the benefit of doubt, the police in this instance presumably must have felt there was enough there to warrant some form of “infiltration”.

There were three investigational groups that became directly involved. The respective mandates and the nuanced differences was where this file left them susceptible to mistakes.

CSIS is an intelligence agency that deals only in intelligence, it does not go to court, its investigations do not face scrutiny or examination in any public forum. It does not want to be exposed to any public light, out of necessity they argue.

CSIS was formed in the early 1980’s when the MacDonald Commission took Security Service away from the RCMP and formed this alternate agency (the primary reason, ironically considering this case, being that the Commission felt that the RCMP lacked the political sophistication to investigate groups such as the FLQ at the time).

The effectiveness of CSIS and its contributions to our national security, are up for conjecture and debate, as no one is fully versed on what they are doing; short of the cabinet committee on security and intelligence. Therefore, the public will likely remain in the dark, now and into the future. It can be argued that there is an investigational necessity to secrecy in the world of intelligence, but the fact that there never will be a shining light on their operational effectiveness, also makes for a convenient and easy hiding place, and is fully reliant on the public trust of Ottawa and its politicians.

With this mandate and with this structure at CSIS, when they receive or are exposed to information which is of a criminal nature, they are mandate bound to turn it over to the police for further investigation, which in this case is INSET. When CSIS makes the decision to turn over this or any criminal information, in some ways their interest in the case fades, as does their willingness and ability to cooperate.

INSET is the Federally directed group within the RCMP, with sections in the various Provinces including British Columbia. For a number of years it has been an innocuous group, hardly heard from, with a reputation of a good place to spend your retirement years, a sleepy hollow, an arm who often liked to hide behind the nomenclature of “national security” if ever questioned. As a result INSET is rarely heard or seen in the public eye.

However, over the last few years it has enjoyed a renewal, brought on by greater Ottawa Federal interest, a large increase in their manpower resources and budget, and this section began to catch the eye of Major Crime investigators who wanted a little quieter lifestyle. As an example, two of the three INSET investigators who formed the investigative group in this Nuttall case came from Major Crime backgrounds. One other thing should be noted and may be a key to understanding what went wrong, is that these major crime investigators brought with them some major crime investigative techniques; which often included undercover operations. That was their experience, it was part of their toolbox.

The third group of significance who may have played the most significant role in this investigation was the “Undercover Shop”. A relatively small section, which developed about 30 years ago. It was a group specifically designed to get close to the criminal element by being one of them, becoming entrusted by them, with the ultimate goal of obtaining confessions or uncovering criminal ties. It enjoys a somewhat misplaced allure not often found in other investigational teams.

As the years have moved on they have become more exposed through the courts, the techniques often on full display, the methods studied in criminology courses. They even talk about it on their own public website. If you were listening to talk radio today you would have heard their techniques being the subject of talk radio. Any technique that is exposed to such a great degree, is less effective and possibly dangerous.

Over they years the Undercover Unit developed tried and true “scenarios”; staged one act plays with police officers pretending to be part of the criminal element, designed to further their credibility with the target; all hopefully leading to a point where the target fills the need to inform “Mr. Big” about his previous criminality. Ultimately the target wants to please, to gain approval of the actor playing Mr. Big and the acceptance and protection of the fake criminal group. In some cases, these scenarios drag on, and there can be over over fifty such “scenarios” or more, but in this Nuttall case, there were only twenty-eight, which may also be a flag of either wanting the file to end, or one borne of a hurried desperation to reach the goal.

In the late 1990’s the U.C. unit became heavily involved with Major Crime teams and began to deal almost exclusively with homicide cases. since 2008 they have been involved in some 350 cases in which 95% have resulted in conviction.) These were cases where murders had been committed, the suspect had been identified by major crime investigators, and the goal of the undercover operation was to get a “confession” to the crime, often to corroborate and verify the circumstantial evidence in the case. It was an important role to play, but it was not up to this group to conduct the investigation.

The Undercover Unit’s exposure in the courts over the last ten years has led many investigators, lawyers, and academics to question whether their techniques are becoming fragile; that these techniques only work on the feeble minded, the un-connected, the neophytes of the criminal world. The unit was becoming less successful with more exposure, and several times have been called out by their “targets” as being the police. They do not talk about the cases that went wrong, nor should you ever hear about them, at least in theory.

So these two factions came together, INSET and the U.C. group, no doubt with the approval of upper management in both B.C. and in Ottawa and a decision was made that an undercover operation would be undertaken. Even though there had been no offence committed, by Nuttall or Korody, and maybe just as notable even though there was no confession being sought. This was by its very design somewhat of a fishing trip, characteristic in some ways of any “infiltration”.

The U.C. group was about to undertake an operation with no goal other than the infiltration of these two abhorrent but sad individuals, but began using a technique that was geared to obtaining specific results, a confession, a “Mr. Big”. The nature of the scenarios were a combination of a need to infiltrate, but they also began using techniques aimed at ending at a Mr. Big. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive from any investigators standpoint and could lead to confusion in the goals if nothing else. How does one aim for a confession if there is no crime? The very setup and the road they were going down was pre-destined to lead to claims of entrapment. They needed to create the crime and push the two targets toward it, the building blocks to an argument of being entrapped.

One should also point out that these types of operations can easily get into the millions of dollars in terms of cost, but there was no municipal or provincial budget oversight–INSET and the U.C. group were playing with Federal monies. (It is interesting to note that with this new found interest in terrorist files in Ottawa, INSET’s budget went from $717,000 in 2003 and in 2013, the year of this case, it was at $22.9 million.)

So the Undercover Operation began. The “hook” or “bump” into Nuttall by the undercover operators was tried and true, the old “would you help me look for my sister” line to act as a public introduction. Nuttall fell hook line and sinker, which in some ways should also have been a red flag, a warning signal as to Nuttall’s mental capacity and competence. He eventually became so enamoured with the operator that he even declared his love for him.

Without going into all the scenarios that were employed, suffice to say that Nuttall throughout: talked of extravagant plans, made ridiculous demands, was unable to focus, could not carry out the simplest of tasks. He went from wanting to kill civilians, to wanting to kill soldiers, from wanting to blow up a nuclear submarine, to blowing up a passenger ferry but not wanting to kill children or innocents. He wanted to blow up the “train” to Victoria, so was quite disappointed to find there was no train that went to Victoria.

He went from wanting to build rockets, and getting access to sniper rifles, to eventually settling for the building of pressure cooker bombs just like the Boston bombers. This more controllable goal was pushed at the suggestion and direction of the Undercover group.

The U.C. “shop” continued to focus on getting Nuttall to write down his plans, no doubt believing that it would be corroboration of his intent and capabilities. Nuttall claimed to have those plans on his laptop, then discovered to not having plans, to being asked to write down plans, and then not being able to physically complete them.

His goals went from freeing Omar Khadr, to forcing the American army out of Afghanistan, to having all the prisoners released from Guantanamo. He was “in training” when he was playing “paintball”. His goals, dreams, needs and plans changed daily. He could not carry out a common grocery list even when directed by the UC operator.

So it was borne out of necessity that the Undercover group began to direct him. (It should be noted that the primary undercover operator despite all of the above, testified that he did not believe that Nuttall was “incapable”).

Once the police begin to direct, all the police personnel involved should have been aware that they were no longer toying with “entrapment” they were now within its grasp. And as early as May 2013 some opinion inside the U.C. shop began to talk about the fact that they were exerting too much influence through the primary undercover operator. One of the investigative team Sargents argued that Nuttall and Korody did not represent a “risk”. Sources say that this Sargent ended up leaving the investigative team, turning over the running of the file to someone with more intensity to push this file.

So it carried on, with Nuttall carrying on his delusional path. At one point he even breaks down crying because he can not write out a plan as he had been directed. He fears the wrath of the undercover operator because he couldn’t do what he was told, even on one occaisson bringing a “marble gun” for protection. After finally settling with a plan, albeit unwritten, to blow up the Parliament buildings in Victoria.

Nuttall insists on videotaping a “recce” to check out the target area discreetly. He is promptly seen talking to police, tourist guides, and using his own name, clearly not having learned the lesson that he should be somewhat covert.

Nuttall emerges from this mayhem, with an agreement with the undercover team to build pressure cooker bombs, just like the Boston brothers. The undercover team manages to control this process, to the point that they were able to make them inert and give them back to Nuttall, so they could be buried in the bushes outside the Victoria Legislature buildings. (They also forget to get the appropriate warrant to give the “bombs” back to Nuttall with a minute trace of C4 and the courts pointed out that the RCMP had in fact broken the law)

Nuttall gets cold feet as the moment nears, to the point of asking for a “spiritual advisor”, and refers to dying like a “martyr”. Graciously, he says he would bequeath his paint gun to the undercover operator for future training purposes.

In the end of this farcical operation, they are allowed to bury the bombs in the “bushes”, and then went and sat in a hotel room waiting for the news to report their feat. Of course, they were bitterly disappointed when the news did not erupt.

With little trouble they were then arrested.

Equally surprising in this tale of misdeeds is that at the end of it all, the police managed to convince the Crown to lay charges.

And then, after the stay of proceedings placed by the trial Judge, The Crown had the audacity to appeal it, spending more tax dollars on clearly a fruitless mission. The Crown, argued in its appeal, that the two suspects were “completely responsible for crafting and carrying out the plan…and the RCMP operation was not manipulative”. It must have been hard keeping a straight face in their applications. There may have been mistakes made by the trial Judge in terms of some of the more legal issues, but no one could possibly argue that this was not entrapment.

The trial judge, Justice Catherine Bruce rightly said that the undercover operator “actually propelled Nuttall to a more extreme view”. She said the RCMP “instigated and skillfully engineered the very terrorist act committed by the defendants”. The RCMP “induced the commission of an offence..without reasonable suspicion or while acting mala fides”. One can forgive the odd Mountie from not understanding “entrapment”, but how do a group of lawyers not understand it.

So where does this leave us. After millions of dollars spent in lawyers and police operations and the errors in judgement will there be repercussions? Obviously not, this is government, this is the infallible RCMP, after all they are not holding anyone responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in sexual harassment claims.

It should raise questions, not just confined to the individual officers, but to the upper echelons, the supervisors who read and approved of these actions. We have a multi-layered and dysfunctional RCMP in terms of investigational mandates and recognition as to what constitutes a security threat. Sources are telling me that there is another three year long operation, which has also fallen under the same spell as Nuttall. That is trying to find suspects where none exist.

All of this is amplified by an Ottawa which has a severe disconnect with those officers on the ground who are conducting the investigations.

Miscommunication and understanding was compounded by a dogmatic and unbendable and unimaginative Undercover group who continue to use outdated techniques, not being able to recognize that the circumstances should not have been addressed by another “Mr Big”.

It was hurt by an intransigent investigative team, who seemed incapable of understanding entrapment, who just let the machine grind forward. One does not believe for a minute that the officers involved were ill-intentioned. They were struggling inside some vague criminal laws, were lacking sound guidance from Crown along the way and needed a fuller appreciation of the level of sophistication needed to prove an act of terrorism.

There is a monumental lack of understanding that a terrorist act is a political act. There is a 120 year old saying that “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”. Nuttall and Korody were neither.

Was Mr. Nuttall and Ms Korody dangerous individuals? To be sure. There are lots of dangerous people out there, just read Twitter.

There is a layered dysfunction in the RCMP. It is an organization consumed by gender and identity politics while a tornado of police needs and demands circle. Always trying to be the one fits all agency, all things to everyone. Doing everything, but not anything well. Whether it be white collar crime, child or internet crime, it never admits its failure, nor do they admit that they have been pulled in every direction while the government ignores or exacerbates chronic manpower and resource issues. They have grown or have been stretched too far, now too big to succeed. Only strong leadership and an honest appraisal of the capabilities and needs of this organization will pull it out of this flat spin.

*All the quotes in this story can be found from the judgement itself listed here:  2018 BCCA 479.

**Also, in terms of full disclosure, the author has had experience in major crime cases, and specifically in major crime cases, where an undercover operation which used the Mr. Big was employed. Some were successful, some were not. The author also was a member of Security Service which then became CSIS.

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